Luxon's Twelve Acts Of Constitutional Contempt

Chris Luxon - CEO of New Zealand

Constitutional vandalism doesn't always announce itself as such. It does not arrive in the form of rockets or tanks, nor does it require the suspension of Parliament or the arrest of judges.

It arrives, instead, dressed in the language of democratic mandate, of delivering on election promises, of parliamentary sovereignty, and it is precisely this variety of vandalism that the Luxon-led coalition government has been practising, with increasing boldness and decreasing embarrassment, since it took office in late 2023.

New Zealand does not yet possess a written, entrenched constitution of the kind that makes such conduct immediately and visibly illegal.

What it does possess, and what the current government has shown a systematic willingness to erode, is a body of constitutional convention that is, if anything, more fragile precisely because it depends upon the good faith of those in power to uphold it. That good faith has been conspicuously absent since the coalition of chaos took power.

The pattern, once you observe it, is impossible to miss. A court or tribunal hands down a ruling that inconveniences the government’s misguided ideological programme. The government’s response isn’t to appeal, isn’t to seek further clarification, isn’t to adjust its policy settings in light of the law. The response is to legislate the inconvenience away.

Consider the disestablishment of Te Aka Whai Ora, the Māori Health Authority, by Health Minister Shane Reti in February 2024. The Waitangi Tribunal had scheduled an urgent hearing into the proposed closure.

The government’s response was to introduce the Pae Ora (Disestablishment of Māori Health Authority) Amendment Bill on 27 February 2024, two days before the hearing was due to begin, and pass it under urgency within days.

When the Tribunal eventually restored its jurisdiction and conducted its inquiry, it found the Crown had breached multiple Treaty principles. 

Reti and the government responded with silence, offering not a word of substantive engagement, no acknowledgement of wrongdoing, no corrective action, only the quiet arrogance of a government that has decided the findings of independent constitutional bodies are an inconvenience to be absorbed, not an obligation to be met.

 

On 29 November 2024, Te Ao Māori News reported:

Coalition’s scrapping of Māori Health Authority breaches Treaty - Waitangi Tribunal

The Waitangi Tribunal says the government’s quick disestablishment of Te Aka Whai Ora (Māori Health Authority) breached Treaty of Waitangi principles.

The tribunal today released the first part of its report on the disestablishment.

It found that the move breached Treaty principles, including tino rangatiratanga, good government, partnership (including the duties of consultation, and acting reasonably and in good faith), active protection and redress.

 

The conduct surrounding the repeal of section 7AA of the Oranga Tamariki Act also deserves particular scrutiny, because it involves not one court interaction but two. When the Waitangi Tribunal summoned Children’s Minister Karen Chhour to give evidence about the proposed repeal, Crown lawyers went to the High Court to block the summons and won. The matter was appealed.

On 13 May 2024, the Court of Appeal unanimously overturned the High Court’s ruling, confirming that the Tribunal had the clear legal authority to summons a sitting minister. The following day, the very next day, Chhour introduced the repeal bill to Parliament, ending the Tribunal’s jurisdiction entirely.

That isn’t parliamentary sovereignty. That is using Parliament as a shield against judicial accountability. The Tribunal had already found the repeal breached the Treaty’s guarantee of Māori self-determination. The bill passed into law on 3 April 2025 regardless. 

On 13 May 2024, RNZ reported: 

 

Court of Appeal overturns decision that blocked Children's Minister from Waitangi Tribunal summons

The Court of Appeal has overturned a High Court decision which blocked a summons order from the Waitangi Tribunal for Children's Minister Karen Chhour.

The court released its decision on Monday.

At the same time, a bill proposing the repeal of section 7AA from the Oranga Tamariki Act has been introduced to Parliament, meaning the Tribunal no longer has jurisdiction over the case.

In its ruling, the court acknowledged the importance of the Waitangi Tribunal's role in inquiry into legislation that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and that the minister had relevant evidence to give to the Tribunal.

It disagreed with the High Court's ruling that the principle of comity, or legal reciprocity, applied to the Tribunal.

 

Treaty Negotiations Minister Paul Goldsmith provides perhaps the most candid admission of what this government has been doing. When the coalition introduced legislation to override a 2023 Court of Appeal decision that had lowered the test for Māori customary marine title, and then pressed ahead with even harsher restrictions after winning in the Supreme Court, Goldsmith himself acknowledged: “It’s not a desirable situation, obviously we thought long and hard about this, it’s very unusual for the government to overturn court decisions in this way.”

Goldsmith was right that it is unusual. But unfortunately the unusual aspect did not give him or the Government pause for thought.

The Marine and Coastal Area amendment is especially egregious because the government actually won its Supreme Court appeal in December 2024. Any principled administration would have accepted that outcome as a vindication of its position and governed accordingly. Instead, Goldsmith declared the win insufficient and pressed ahead with legislation that goes further than even the court’s revised test, applying retrospectively to July 2024 and voiding customary marine title orders that had already been lawfully granted.

Communities that had spent decades navigating the courts to have their rights recognised were told, in effect, that those rights were cancelled by executive fiat.

On 11 August 2025, The Spinoff reported:

 

Why the government is changing the Marine and Coastal Area Act

In 2023, the Court of Appeal was asked to interpret the test for the recognition of customary marine title. The terms “exclusive occupation”, “in accordance with tikanga” and “without substantial interruption”, for example, all needed to be interpreted by the Court to make it clear exactly what they meant in practice. What if, for example, two iwi had control of an area according to their tikanga, which allowed each of those iwi to access that area, but excluded all others? Would that count as exclusive occupation under the law?

The Court of Appeal decision in 2023 clarified the relevant tests, but the government disagreed with the result. Normally when that occurs, the losing side can appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. That’s what happened in this case, but rather than wait for the Supreme Court’s decision, in 2024 the government introduced the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) (Customary Marine Title) Amendment Bill. The bill was specifically designed to overrule the Court of Appeal decision. 

Chris Bishop and Todd McClay have similarly deployed the legislative sledgehammer against the judiciary in the freshwater sphere. When the High Court ruled in March 2024 that a Canterbury irrigation company could not obtain a discharge consent because it would cause ongoing significant adverse effects on aquatic life, a ruling that faithfully applied section 107 of the Resource Management Act as it had existed, unamended, since 1991, the government’s response was to amend section 107 through the Resource Management (Freshwater and Other Matters) Amendment Act, passed in October 2024.

The entire point of the amendment was to make lawful what the High Court had found unlawful, an unconstitutional overreach usually only found in authoritarian dictatorships.

Associate Justice Minister Nicole McKee performed the same manoeuvre in the criminal sphere, reinstating the three-strikes sentencing regime that the Supreme Court had found produced outcomes in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’s prohibition on disproportionately severe punishment.

What each of these instances shares is a structural contempt for the separation of powers. The executive and legislative branches of government aren’t constitutionally entitled to be insulated from judicial scrutiny of their conduct. Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal exist precisely to hold the Crown to account where its actions exceed lawful bounds or breach Treaty obligations.

When a government responds to adverse findings not by modifying its conduct but by changing the law to permit the conduct that courts have found impermissible, it isn’t exercising democratic authority. It is converting Parliament into an instrument for laundering executive lawlessness.

Social Development Minister Louise Upston pursued the same logic when, following a High Court ruling that the Ministry of Social Development had been acting unlawfully in clawing back supplementary assistance payments from ACC recipients, the government simply amended the Social Security Act to retrospectively authorise the very conduct the court had struck down. The injured and the disabled, people who had won a ruling protecting them from an unlawful government practice, found that their victory had been voided before they could act on it.

 

On 17 February 2026, RNZ reported:

Incoming law change so MSD can claw back welfare payments off ACC clients

The government has introduced legislation so the welfare system can legally claw back payments when someone has been backpaid for an ACC claim.

Social Development and Employment Minister Louise Upston moved a motion of urgency to introduce the Social Security (Accident Compensation and Calculation of Weekly Income) Amendment Bill shortly after 7.30pm.

It comes after a significant High Court ruling against the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) on the recovery of welfare payments late last year.

The ruling said MSD couldn't require people to pay back supplementary assistance they'd received (like accommodation supplements and winter energy payments) once they had been paid back-dated compensation from Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC).

 

One could perhaps extend some limited tolerance to a government that occasionally, under genuine duress and with transparent acknowledgement of the constitutional tension involved, found it necessary to override a court finding of narrow legal scope. New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements do permit Parliament to legislate in ways that courts cannot override.

But this government has not been doing this reluctantly, narrowly, or transparently. It has been doing it reflexively, broadly, and without any genuine grappling with the rule-of-law implications or the implications to other established legislation. It has treated the courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, and the Bill of Rights Act as obstacles to be circumnavigated rather than as structural elements of the constitutional order it is supposed to uphold.

The cumulative record is damning. Over the course of little more than two years, the Luxon coalition has timed legislation to kill tribunal hearings mid-inquiry; introduced bills the day after losing in court; overridden the first-ever judicial enforcement of three decades of freshwater protection law; retroactively voided customary rights that had been lawfully recognised; reinstated a sentencing regime found to breach fundamental human rights guarantees; and legislated away a High Court ruling protecting sick and injured New Zealanders from unlawful government debt recovery.

Christopher Luxon has said very little about any of this. He isn’t required to say much when the ministers responsible, Reti, Chhour, Goldsmith, McKee, Bishop, McClay, Upston, are each individually insulated by the pretence that they are merely implementing coalition commitments.
But the pattern of conduct belongs to the government as a whole, and the Prime Minister bears responsibility for the constitutional culture he has allowed, and actively encouraged, to take hold.

A government that treats the courts as an inconvenience to be legislated around isn’t a government committed to the rule of law. It is a government that has decided its electoral programme outranks the legal and constitutional framework within which all New Zealand governments are supposed to operate. 

Those decisions, made quietly and without fanfare, across a dozen separate legislative acts, deserves to be named for what they are: a sustained and deliberate assault on the constitutional conventions that protect every New Zealander from the unchecked exercise of executive power.

The courts can be overridden. Tribunals can be sidelined. Bills of Rights can be disregarded. What cannot so easily be recovered, once lost, is the principle that no government in New Zealand is above the law, including, and especially, this one.

# Date	What was overridden	Minister responsible	How
1 Feb–Mar 2024	Waitangi Tribunal hearing (Māori Health Authority)	Shane Reti	Rushed legislation through Parliament before the Tribunal could issue its report.
2 May 2024	Court of Appeal ruling (Tribunal can summons Ministers)	Karen Chhour	Introduced s7AA repeal bill the next day, directly mooting the Court of Appeal ruling.
3 May 2024	Waitangi Tribunal Treaty breach finding (s7AA)	Karen Chhour	Introduced the bill the same day as the ruling and passed it into law in April 2025.
4 May–Jul 2024	Waitangi Tribunal Treaty breach finding (Māori Wards)	Simeon Brown	Passed the legislation regardless of the Tribunal’s Treaty breach finding.
5 Jul–Dec 2024	Court of Appeal 2023 & Supreme Court win (MACA)	Paul Goldsmith	Advanced legislation that exceeded both court rulings and applied it retrospectively.
6 Oct 2024	High Court (RMA s107 freshwater pollution)	Penny Simmonds	Reversed the first-ever s107 enforcement action through new legislation.
7 Oct 2024	Environment Court rulings (RMA s70 farm runoff)	Penny Simmonds	Amended s70 to permit farm discharges into already degraded waterways.
8 Dec 2024	Supreme Court (three strikes = Bill of Rights breach)	Nicole McKee	Reinstated three strikes law with only minor modifications despite the ruling.
9 May 2025	Waitangi Tribunal (Regulatory Standards Bill)	David Seymour	Introduced bill days after Tribunal report despite urgent Māori consultation call; enacted November 2025.
10 2025–2026	Supreme Court (PSGE subject to Māori Land Court)	Tama Potaka	Proposed bill allowing post-settlement entities to opt out of Māori Land Court oversight.
11 Feb 2026	High Court (MSD can't claw back ACC supplementary payments)	Louise Upston	Legislated to allow clawback of ACC payments exactly as ruled unlawful by the High Court.
12 Feb 2026	Supreme Court (Uber drivers are employees)	Brooke van Velden	Added a gateway test to the Employment Relations Act to prospectively block employee challenges.

How New Zealand Courts Protect Well-Connected Pedophiles

There is a particular kind of dishonesty practised by the mainstream media and the Courts of New Zealand when a powerful man is caught and sentenced for sexually abusing a child. It does not manifest as outright falsehood. It is more insidious than that. It lives in the misleading language chosen, in the euphemisms deployed, the passive constructions adopted, the clinical distance maintained between the reader and the reality of what occurred. The case of Greg Hornblow, former chief executive of NZME's OneRoof, offers a masterclass in this phenomenon.

On 2 April 2026, 1News reported:

Former NZME Executive Who Hired Underage Girl for 'Sexual Services' Named

Gregory Hornblow suppression lapses: Former exec convicted of receiving underage sexual services

The former media executive who admitted paying a 14 year-old for sex and fought to keep his name secret can now be named.

Gregory Rex Hornblow was sentenced in March at the Auckland District Court to 10 months home detention and ordered to pay reparation payments of $3000 to the teenager.

The 60 year-old was the chief executive of One Roof - the property arm owned by the New Zealand Herald publisher NZME - when he was charged with receiving commercial sexual services.

How can he be charged with commercial sexual services? The girl was a 14-year old. She isn't old enough to consent, which makes it sexual abuse of a minor.

Judge Maxwell refused Hornblow's application for a discharge without conviction, as well as his permanent name suppression.

A law change last year meant the victim had to agree to the man's identity remaining suppressed, which Judge Maxwell said she did not.

She gave discounts for his guilty plea, remorse, and reported good character.

He was convicted and sentenced to 10-months of home detention as well as the $3000 in emotional harm reparations.

The headline 1News has used is also very problematic. Hornblow did not HIRE an underage girl for 'sexual services'. The pedophile paid to rape an underage girl. Claiming the victim was providing sexual services, as though the transaction were akin to a catering arrangement, shows clear media bias in favour of the sexual abuser. As though the quotes around sexual services were sufficient to signal to readers that something dark had occurred.

Furthermore, Hornblow was still chief executive of OneRoof, the property arm owned by the New Zealand Herald publisher NZME, when he sexually abused a child. Claiming he was a former NZME executive officer when he "hired" a child for sexual services is misleading framing.

What Hornblow did isn't a consensual or commercial arrangement that strayed into illegality at the margins. He sexually exploited a child while he was working for NZME. It is plainly written under New Zealand law that children cannot consent to sexual activity. That is the entire point of the legal age of consent.

The Prostitution Reform Act 2003 does not merely regulate commercial sex with minors, it criminalises it, with a maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment, precisely because the concept of a minor selling sexual services is a legal fiction. There is no transaction. There is only abuse of a minor.

On 9 March 2026, RNZ reported:

Former Auckland executive who paid teen $1000 for sex, sentenced to 10 months home detention

A former Auckland executive has been denied permanent name suppression, but still cannot be named after being convicted of receiving "commercial sexual services" from a person aged under 18.

The executive admitted to the charge in November 2025.

He was sentenced in the Auckland District court on Monday to 10-month home detention and ordered to pay $3,000 in emotional harm reparations, however, an appeal from his lawyer means he still can't be named.

The man's lawyer, Graeme Newell sought a discharge without conviction, saying his client believed the girl involved to be 17-years-old.

In reality, she was 14.

The facts reported are damning enough. Judge Kathryn Maxwell found that Hornblow enticed the victim with full knowledge that she was too young to be offering commercial sex services. Despite this, Hornblow had extended name suppression. He described himself, in his own words, as a sugar daddy, a term that carries its own ideological freight, domesticating what is in practice grooming.

Most damningly of all, he actively coached the girl to tell investigators that he had not paid her for sex. This isn't merely a man who made an error of judgement. This is a man who, having abused a child, then attempted to suborn her into silence in order to escape accountability.

The sentence handed down by the Auckland District Court was ten months' home detention and $3,000 in emotional harm reparation. Ten months at home. Three thousand dollars. We often see similar light sentences whenever a prominent man is caught abusing their position of power.

On 18 December 2025, RNZ reported:

Jevon McSkimming Avoids Jail Sentence Over Possession of Child Sexual Exploitation Material

Disgraced former deputy police commissioner Jevon McSkimming has avoided jail time, instead sentenced to nine months home detention, at the Wellington District Court this afternoon.

He pleaded guilty in November to three representative charges of possessing objectionable publications, namely child sexual exploitation and bestiality material.

In handing down his sentence, Judge Tim Black declined to order McSkimming's registration on the child sex offending registry, as his risk to the community was assessed as low.

His lawyer Letizea Ord told the court he was "very remorseful", and had described himself as "deeply ashamed".

In front of an almost-full public gallery, McSkimming stood in the dock, shifting his weight, and nodding occasionally as the judge handed down his sentence.

From a starting point of three years, Judge Black applied reductions of fifty percent for the early guilty plea, rehabilitation efforts, the steps he had taken at his home to prevent reoffending, as well as prior good character and remorse.

"You've done a lot of good in the community, as well as the bad reflected in this offending," he told McSkimming.

He arrived at a sentence of nine months per charge home detention, to be served concurrently, noting his career made him a "prime target for serious violence" in prison.

To appreciate quite how inadequate this outcome is, consider the comparative landscape of New Zealand sentencing for offences against children. In December 2025, disgraced former deputy police commissioner Jevon McSkimming received nine months' home detention for possessing child sexual exploitation and bestiality material.

These sentences are themselves the subject of legitimate criticism, but the point is this: Hornblow, who did not merely view images but physically abused a child and subsequently attempted to obstruct justice, received a sentence that sits comfortably within the range reserved for possession offences. The deterrent signal sent to would-be predators in positions of power could scarcely be more accommodating.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Hornblow's professional standing and political leanings played a role in the leniency extended to him. The sentencing courts in this country have shown, with troubling consistency, a disposition to treat the fall from privilege, the lost executive salary, the reputational damage, the cancelled LinkedIn profile, as a form of punishment in itself, deserving of mitigation.

The child whose exploitation Hornblow was convicted of receives only $3,000 and the knowledge that the justice system judged her harm to be worth ten months of inconvenience in a comfortable home.

New Zealand has a problem with how it sentences child sexual offenders, and it has a problem with how the media frames their offending. Both failures serve the same function: they maintain the fiction that abuse perpetrated by men of standing is a different order of transgression from abuse perpetrated by those without it. It isn't. The child does not experience the abuse differently because her abuser holds an executive title. The harm is the same.

Until our courts and our newsrooms are willing to say so plainly, deterrence of this sort of crime will remain a fiction, and the impunity a reality.

Luxon Rearranges the Deckchairs as National Sinks

Unlike most politicians, the numbers do not lie. The latest RNZ Reid Research poll, placing National at 30.8 percent against Labour's 35.6 percent, and Christopher Luxon at his lowest preferred prime minister rating since assuming the National leadership, isn't merely a bad fortnight's news for a beleaguered prime minister.

It is the crystallisation of something that has been forming, slowly and then all at once, since the coalition of chaos government took office in late 2023: a public verdict on a government that has consistently failed to match its rhetoric with results.

Luxon arrived in the Beehive on a very specific promise. He was the turnaround chief executive, the man who had run Air New Zealand, and who would apply that same managerial oversight to a nation struggling under the weight of post-pandemic inflation, a creaking health system, and a housing crisis of historic proportions. New Zealanders, exhausted by the cost of living crisis, gave him the benefit of the doubt. Two and a half years on, that benefit has been exhausted.

The coalition's economic record has become the central wound in its political body. Unemployment reached a decade high on Luxon's watch, food prices have soared, and the promised recovery, the supposed green shoots, the "economic growth" Luxon invokes as reflexively as a mantra, has been halting at best and invisible at worst.

The coalition of chaos dismantled initiatives designed to improve the cost of living: discounted public transport, the clean car discount, and, crucially, a 70-million-litre diesel storage facility that would now be operational had the government not cancelled it. These were not ideological indulgences. They were practical buffers against precisely the kind of external shock that has now arrived.

That shock, of course, is the fuel crisis precipitated by Trump's illegal war on Iran, which has sent petrol prices past four dollars per litre in some Auckland suburbs and pushed inflation toward a forecast peak of 4.2 percent for the year to June 2026.

The government's response, to offer Trump support and provide up to $50 per week for roughly 143,000 qualifying families, which has been received with widespread derision. Beneficiaries, pensioners, students, small business owners, solo commuters, and the self-employed fall outside its narrow parameters entirely.

Luxon's framing, that this is responsible fiscal management rather than callousness, lands poorly with those who receive nothing while their diesel bills have increased by 70% since the conflict began.

The political management of the crisis has also been revealing. Luxon's performance at an early press conference, during which he declared that "any action" to stop the Iranian regime would be "a good thing" before walking the statement back, and then having to return to Parliament late at night to correct an answer given during Question Time, further damaged his credibility. More telling still was his conspicuous absence from the announcement of the four-phase fuel security plan, while Nicola Willis and Shane Jones occupied the foreground.

The Public, correctly, has an expectation that the head of government fronts in a genuine national crisis. Luxon, however, then decided that he had to fly off to Samoa to receive the chiefly title of matai in another expensive photo-op the country didn't need and couldn't afford.

None of this occurs in a vacuum. The polling trajectory has been worsening for months. When the Taxpayers' Union Curia poll placed National at 28.4 percent in early March, the figure triggered open speculation about Luxon's future in the role, speculation that he moved swiftly to extinguish. The subsequent Talbot Mills poll, placing National at 32 percent against Labour's 35 percent, offered some relief, though it still projected a hung parliament of 61 seats apiece.

The RNZ Reid Research result, with National at 30.8 percent and Labour at 35.6 percent, sits squarely within that dispiriting range. There is no upward trend to cling to. There is only a party trading between bad and worse.

The Roy Morgan poll for March 2026 is the most significant data point of the entire term. It places National at just 26.5 percent, its lowest level of support since the party took office. Government confidence fell 6.5 points to 78, and a majority of 56 percent of voters now say New Zealand is heading in the wrong direction. This isn't a wobble. It is a structural collapse in the public's confidence in this government and the person who leads it.

On 2 April 2026, Roy Morgan Research posted:

Roy Morgan New Zealand Poll: Support for National-led Government and Labour-led Opposition now tied

Amongst the National-led Government support for National dropped 4.5% to 26.5% - its lowest level of support since National was elected to Government in late 2023, support for NZ First was up 1.5% to 11% - its highest level of support since being elected to Government, while support for ACT was up 2% to 10%.

...

“Of concern for the Luxon-led Government will be the low Government Confidence Rating at only 78 – the lowest Government Confidence Rating since the election victory in late 2023.

“An increasing majority of 56% (up 4% points) of New Zealand electors say the country is ‘heading in the wrong direction’ and only 34% (down 2.5% points) say the country is ‘heading in the right direction’. In addition, ANZ-Roy Morgan New Zealand Consumer Confidence crashed 8.8 points to 91.3 in March its lowest level since October 2024.

“Luxon and his National colleagues are hoping to avoid being the first one-term New Zealand Government for over 50 years since 1975.”

It was into this environment of cascading polling disaster that Luxon chose, on the same day as that Roy Morgan result was published, to announce a cabinet reshuffle. The timing wasn't coincidental. Reports had leaked of a Sunday night gathering of Luxon loyalists in Auckland over the preceding weekend, a meeting that prompted yet another cycle of leadership speculation. A reshuffle announced urgently in the middle of a sitting week is a reshuffle announced from a position of weakness, not from the calm of a government in command of its own destiny.

The appointments themselves deserve more scrutiny than they have received. The promotion of Chris Penk to Minister of Defence and responsibility for the GCSB, SIS, and Space portfolios is the most consequential and, depending on your confidence in the man's capabilities, the most alarming. Penk is a former NZDF lawyer who oversaw the largest decline in construction New Zealand has ever seen as Building and Construction minister, a role that, whatever its merits, bears no meaningful relationship to the responsibilities he now carries.

Holy Chris Penk -

New rules for building a granny flat are still complex, full of restrictions & just as expensive as they always were

The real change is that when things go wrong, they shift the burden of responsibility from the council to homeownershttps://t.co/JqbFZi0XCQ

— Mountain_Tui (@Mountain_Tui) February 27, 2026

That a minister of such unremarkable profile has been handed oversight of New Zealand's intelligence apparatus and its armed forces, at the precise moment when the global security environment is as volatile as it has been in decades, says less about Penk's fitness for the role than about the thinness of the available "talent" within the National Party.

Luxon's mantra of right minister, right time, rings hollow when the minister in question has done little to demonstrate why he is the right person for this particular moment. New Zealanders might reasonably ask whether the person, an unrepentant class clown, now overseeing the country's most sensitive intelligence operations has the depth of strategic understanding the moment demands.

Then there is Paul Goldsmith, appointed as the new Minister for Pacific Peoples. Despite the late Nikki Kaye incorrectly identifying Goldsmith as being Māori to try and bolster diversity claims in 2020, he is a Pākehā who introduced himself for the role by saying "talofa" and offering that his primary credential is being an Aucklander born and bred in the greatest Pacific city in the world. His prime minister, visibly uncomfortable when asked to justify the appointment, freely admitted that National has no Pasifika representation anywhere in its caucus or cabinet.

That admission of structural failure was delivered as though geographical proximity to a large Pasifika population were a reasonable substitute for having Pacific people in positions of actual influence. The real challenge of the Pacific Peoples portfolio isn't knowing where Auckland is. It is addressing a Pacific unemployment rate of 12.3 percent, more than twice the national average.

The situation with the Ethnic Communities portfolio is no better. Mark Mitchell, another Pākehā minister who simultaneously holds the Police portfolio, has held the Ethnic Communities brief since January 2025, when Melissa Lee, the only Korean-New Zealander to have served in the National caucus in the party's modern history, was stripped of her remaining ministerial roles.

Whatever Lee's limitations, she brought direct lived experience to a portfolio that exists specifically to represent communities that are not white, not Pākehā, and not adequately served by the political mainstream. Assigning both Police and Ethnic Communities to the same minister sends a peculiar signal about how seriously the government regards the portfolio's purpose.

The handling of Chris Bishop is, in its own way, the most politically revealing aspect of the reshuffle. Bishop is widely acknowledged, including by those who find his politics uncongenial, as one of the most capable figures in the National caucus: a skilled debater, a strategic thinker, and someone who could credibly contest the leadership if the opportunity arose.

According to reporting in the Sunday Star-Times and elsewhere, Bishop had, toward the end of last year, been sounding out caucus support in a manner characterised as a failed coup. Whether or not that characterisation is precise, Luxon's response is instructive.

Bishop was stripped of the Leader of the House role, which gave him genuine institutional power over Parliament's daily operations, and of the campaign chairmanship, which would have placed him at the centre of National's election strategy. Both were handed to the more loyal but less capable Simeon Brown.

Luxon framed this as workload management. The framing doesn't withstand scrutiny. The replacement role, Attorney-General, is by general agreement a prestigious but not especially demanding portfolio, one analyst aptly described it as acting more like a referee than a player. The real effect of the changes is to remove Bishop from positions where influence accumulates.

A leader who neutralises his most capable internal rival rather than deploying that talent in the party's electoral interests has prioritised personal survival over National's November prospects. That isn't leadership. It is self-preservation dressed up as administration. But what else would you expect from a self-entitled CEO?

The removal of competitive internal challenge isn't healthy politics for any party, least of all one in the position National now finds itself. A leader who surrounds himself with loyalists rather than talent is a leader who has made a choice, and it isn't the one the country needs.

On 2 April 2026, Newsroom reported:

Luxon’s reshuffle: Why Chris Bishop’s ‘demotion’ raises new leadership questions

But alienating a senior and influential minister, a strong performer who could yet mount a more successful challenge if (or when) Luxon next has a high-profile stumble, is not without risk.

Brown hardly did his part to aid Cabinet camaraderie, repeatedly ducking questions about whether he had asked to take over from Bishop as campaign chair.

The health minister also usurped Simon Watts, taking back the energy portfolio he had handed over in early 2025. Luxon said energy security was set to be “the dominant issue for the rest of the year”, making it important to have a member of his senior leadership role in the team – not exactly a vote of confidence in Watts, but further shoring up Brown’s position as a vital member of Luxon’s ‘kitchen cabinet’.

Beyond the internal dynamics of National itself, the coalition's structural tensions continue to intensify. New Zealand First and ACT have been conducting their own parallel campaigns to distinguish themselves from each other and from their senior partner throughout this parliamentary term. Winston Peters voted to pass ACT's Regulatory Standards Act, then promptly pledged to repeal it if re-elected, prompting David Seymour to accuse him of preparing to defect to Labour.

The Roy Morgan numbers tell an instructive story. NZ First is on 11 percent, its highest since entering government, and ACT is on 10 percent. Both minor partners are growing as National shrinks. Whether that growth reflects genuine organic support or National voters seeking refuge in coalition partners rather than abandoning the right bloc entirely is a question without a clean answer.

What is clear is that Peters has calculated, with characteristic shrewdness, that a weakened Luxon serves his party's interests, at least until the moment when National's collapse makes a Labour-led government a certainty.

On 6 March 2026, The Spinoff reported:

As National hits 28% in new poll, is Christopher Luxon’s leadership at risk?

It’s the party’s worst poll result since it regained power at the end of 2023; its lowest until now was 29%, which came in an October 2025 Curia poll. The poll – conducted by the same research company that does National’s internal polling – sees just one tiny win for a single party in the coalition: the Act Party (at 7.5%) has managed to swallow the 0.8 points lost by NZ First (at 9.7%). 

But on the whole, the right bloc has slumped. Assuming the latest Curia poll is reading the tea leaves with precision, National would drop from its current 49 seats to 36 after the election. Now six points ahead, Labour would be able to form a left-bloc government.

...

Then there’s the rest of the coalition. The latest Curia results are not good for the right bloc as a whole. Peters has previously hinted that the party’s internal polling shows NZ First hitting significantly higher numbers than it achieved at the last election, and the party shares with Act ambitions to hit double digits – levels not reached since 2002 in NZ First’s case, and never for Act.

The question the National caucus has been circling without resolution is one of brutal simplicity: is Christopher Luxon the right person to lead the party to November? The polling says no. His preferred prime minister ratings are at their lowest since he took the leadership.

His party is at 26.5 percent on the most recent Roy Morgan measure. He has struggled to project competence in a genuine national emergency. He has made appointments that invite scepticism rather than confidence. He has responded to internal competition by removing it rather than harnessing it.

The argument against rolling a sitting prime minister in an election year is well-worn: the disruption, the narrative of chaos, the time required for a new leader to establish authority. These are real costs. But they need to be weighed against the cost of arriving at a November election with a leader whose public standing has been comprehensively degraded, whose party is haemorrhaging support in all directions, and whose most substantial response to the country's worst economic crisis in years was a fifty-dollar-a-week payment for a few working families with children.

National's caucus has some capable people, among them, political liabilities notwithstanding, Chris Bishop himself. The question is whether any of them has the courage to wake up and say, clearly and without equivocation, that the party cannot afford to contest this election on these numbers with this leader.

National's internal war broke the surface today with the "reshuffle".Bar an unlikely poll surge it'll get very ugly, very soon.

— greg jackson (@therealgregjack) April 2, 2026

A hung parliament, which several recent polls project as the most likely outcome of a 7 November election, would be an outcome rich in political consequence and largely devoid of the clarity New Zealand needs. The centre-left bloc of Labour, the Greens, and Te Pāti Māori holds 61 seats on these numbers, precisely the threshold required. The margin for error is zero, and the possibility of protracted coalition negotiations producing nothing useful for those have been downtrodden by the current coalition of chaos is very real.

New Zealand has navigated complexity under MMP before. It hasn't done so, however, in the middle of an active fuel crisis, with inflation reasserting itself and a global economic environment that offers little shelter.

What the polls ultimately reflect isn't simply dissatisfaction with Luxon as an individual, though that element is present. They reflect a broader public assessment that the current government has made ideological choices, cutting services and subsidies that served as genuine economic buffers, in order to fund tax cuts whose benefits flowed disproportionately to property owners and higher income earners. When external shocks arrived, the cupboard was barer than it needed to be, and the government's capacity to respond was constrained by commitments it had made to its own voter base. That isn't bad luck... it's a consequence of bad management.

Christopher Luxon has said he will not stand aside. He's entitled to steer the ship into the iceberg, and will fight the November election as one of National's most unpopular leaders ever. He may yet recover some ground. But the distance between where this government now stands and where it needs to be in seven months isn't a gap that blind optimism, a reshuffle, or a another press conference about doing nothing is likely to close.

A Crisis Response Designed to Exclude

There's something almost admirably brazen about the way this government operates. When a crisis arrives, one that affects every household in the country regardless of income, employment status, or circumstance, the National-led coalition reaches instinctively for a mechanism that excludes the poorest New Zealanders by design. Not by accident. By design.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis, caused by the United States and Israel launching an illegal war of aggression on Iran, has driven petrol prices to levels not seen in this country's recent memory. Every family that owns or depends upon a vehicle is being squeezed. 

The retired couple driving to their medical appointments. The solo parent on a Jobseeker benefit ferrying children to school across a city with inadequate public transport. The person on a supported living payment who has no realistic alternative to a car to get to their treatments or those on jobseeker support who are required to attend job interviews. All of them are being hit. All of them are suffering.

On 25 March 2026, RNZ reported:

Fuel crisis package: Nearly 150,000 families to receive $50 a week

Speaking to reporters, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said the package struck the right balance.

"It is a hard reality that we cannot alleviate the pressure of rising fuel costs for everyone. And as we have learned from the Covid response would do more damage to our economy, which has just started growing again."

The government's response, announced by Finance Minister Nicola Willis and Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, is to deliver up to fifty dollars a week to approximately 143,000 families through a temporary boost to the In-Work Tax Credit.

The measure will cost an estimated 373 million dollars over a year and has been fastened, with some precision, to an existing mechanism that carries within it an explicit exclusion clause: no person receiving a main benefit from Work and Income may receive it.

On 25 March 2026, RNZ reported:

Who Will Be Eligible to Get an Extra $50 a Week as Part of the Fuel Crisis Package?

It excluded beneficiaries, superannuitants and those without children.

Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and Willis said for beneficiaries, there would be usual increases on April 1 which "working families" did not automatically get.

"And I'd also note, working families face the obligation to get to and from work each day. Beneficiaries do not face that obligation," Willis said.

 

Read that again. The In-Work Tax Credit, by its very architecture, bars beneficiaries from receipt. This was not an oversight. It was a political choice made years ago, and it is a political choice being enthusiastically renewed today.

Willis, when pressed on why families on core benefits were excluded, offered the observation that welfare payments would increase from the first of April through the usual annual inflation adjustments. This is the kind of answer that requires a certain composure to deliver without embarrassment.

Half of NZ's most vulnerable children excluded from fuel relief packagehttps://t.co/zv6DR1CCQh

— Newstalk ZB (@NewstalkZB) March 26, 2026

Those inflation adjustments, modest by any measure, are entirely unrelated to a sudden and severe fuel price shock. They were calculated before the Strait of Hormuz became a flashpoint. They address a different problem.

To offer them as an equivalent response to a specific and acute crisis is not fiscal prudence. It is sophistry dressed as compassion.

On 25 March 2026, the NZ Herald reported:

Fuel Relief: How New Zealand's $50 Support Package Compares with Support Overseas

New Zealand’s newly announced fuel relief package will give about 143,000 “squeezed middle” families $50 a week through a boost to the In-Work Tax Credit.

However, unlike many overseas responses to the oil supply shock, it does not directly reduce the price of petrol at the pump nor offer support to businesses.

There’s also no targeted support for beneficiaries or superannuitants, with neither eligible to receive the boost, which begins on April 7 and will be paid weekly or fortnightly, depending on when people are paid.

What is revealing here is not merely what the policy does, but what it says. The language surrounding the announcement has been carefully chosen. Families in the "squeezed middle." Parents "working hard for a living." The implicit contrast, as always, is with those bottom feeders who are not working hard, who are not deserving, who have made, in the preferred framing of this coalition, poor choices.

The In-Work Tax Credit has always carried this ideological freight. It is a payment that rewards employment with an almost moral fervour, as though being in paid work is itself a virtue sufficient to entitle one to support during a crisis, while being unemployed, elderly, disabled, or otherwise reliant on the state is a condition that forfeits such entitlement.

On 25 March 2026, RNZ reported:

Is Fuel Support Package 'Generous' or Not Enough?

Isaac Gunson, spokesperson for the Child Poverty Action Group, said it would help working for families but there was nothing for people relying on benefits.

"Close to a quarter of a million children live in households receiving a core benefit and the idea that there's no additional support for them that will be made available is pretty outrageous."

While Finance Minister Nicola Willis said they were potentially less affected because they did not have to travel to work, Gunson said they would still need to travel for groceries or job interviews.

He said the 3.1 percent increase in benefits from April 1 would not be enough.

"The idea that benefit dependent households won't face as big a downturn in their finances because they don't have the same obligations to go to work… that just doesn't stand up."

The Child Poverty Action Group has noted the obvious and the New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services has called for the package to be extended to beneficiary families. The Green Party's co-leader Chloe Swarbrick has also pointed out, correctly, that the government has simultaneously pushed people out of work through its neoliberal economic settings and is now withholding crisis relief from those same people.

The current government has increased unemployment by 35% since coming to power, a very sobering figure that should guide peoples voting preferences come November 2026.

On 30 March 2026, the NZ Herald reported:

Fuel Crisis: About 140,000 Families to Receive $50 a Week to Help with High Fuel Prices

The Green Party’s reaction was far more critical, saying it left too many New Zealanders behind.

“The Government’s narrow tweaks to tax credits leaves behind the tens of thousands of people their economic plan has pushed out of work, only to then punish with new obligations and sanctions,” said Green Party co-leader Chlöe Swarbrick.

“So much for planning for the ‘worst-case scenario.’ There is no plan to support people on to public transport and reduce fuel demand, no plan to prevent corporations price-gouging while families cut back on groceries.”

It is worth pausing on the numbers. The income cut-off for the In-Work Tax Credit sits at around $89,000 for a family with one child, rising with each additional child. This is, in practical terms, a payment that can flow to families earning near six figures, while a solo parent surviving on a benefit well below the poverty line receives nothing. The government calls this targeted. One might call it something else.

The increased GST from the first 6 months of rising fuel costs will easily cover the estimate $373 million WFF in-work tax credit for the year. This financial relief should be expanded to all Kiwis on low incomes. Cheapskates, @NZNationalParty. #CostOfLivingCrisis #nzpol pic.twitter.com/oD6gCfnmvd

— Jackal (@Jackalblog) March 24, 2026

This isn't an aberration. It fits precisely into the pattern that has characterised this coalition since it took office: benefit cuts, sanctions, the scrapping of the New Zealand Income Insurance Scheme before it even began, and the steady withdrawal of support from those most deprived of state help while tax arrangements continue to favour those at the top.

The fuel support package is merely the latest expression of a governing philosophy that regards poverty as a personal failure and welfare as a reward to be withheld.

New Zealand has a Child Poverty Reduction Act. It has commitments, statutory ones, to the wellbeing of children regardless of what their parents do for work. Those commitments are being quietly set aside while the government congratulates itself on its fiscal discipline.

The squeezed middle, at least, appears to have the government's attention. Those below the middle can, it seems, be squeezed a little harder.

The Real Cost of Brooke van Velden's Time in Power

Brooke van Velden has resigned as Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety, and the occasion demands considerably more than the polite eulogy that ministerial departures typically attract. Her tenure was, by any serious accounting, one of the most regressive periods in New Zealand's modern labour history. To permit it to dissolve into the news cycle without further examination would be a profound disservice to the hundreds of thousands of workers whose livelihoods and legal protections were stripped away while she held the portfolio.

Let's start with the overnight demolition of pay equity protections for working women. In August 2024, the government rushed amendments to the Equal Pay Act through under urgency, extinguishing the legal mechanisms by which workers in female-dominated industries could pursue pay equity claims. 

The affected workforce, predominantly women employed in aged care, early childhood education, and health support, had in many cases invested years in building claims through the proper channels. Those claims were voided at speed. Subsequent estimates placed the number of affected workers at well over 300,000, including nurses, teachers, support staff, hospice workers, and caregivers, with warnings of care sector breakdowns and skilled workers leaving for Australia.

On 19 March 2025, RNZ reported:

How a crucial 45-minute meeting between ministers took pay equity claims away from tens of thousands of women

Those choices formed the backbone of the government's overhaul of the once "world-leading" Equal Pay Act - retrospectively stripping nurses, teachers, carers and other female-dominated workforces of the right to pursue pay equity claims under the existing law.

Within five weeks of that meeting, Parliament had passed the Equal Pay Amendment Act under urgency - a move the people's select committee last month described as "a flagrant and significant abuse of power".

The legislation was announced then passed all stages of Parliament within three days in May, meaning the public had no opportunity to make submissions through the usual select committee process.

Dozens of in-train claims were stopped. The rules governing future claims were significantly tightened. And $12.8 billion originally earmarked to fix decades of systemic gender discrimination was instead returned to the Crown's Budget allowances.

The government's justification, that the framework was too costly and legally unpredictable, amounted to a frank admission: the rights of low-paid women were to be weighed against fiscal convenience and discarded. Van Velden offered this argument with the characteristic breezy confidence of someone who has never had to worry about whether her wages reflected the gendered undervaluation of her occupation. 

Van Velden even proudly stated that she had saved the Budget by axing pay equity. She said this as though stripping hundreds of thousands of women of the right to fair remuneration was a sensible line item to balance, rather than an act of deliberate economic harm to the most vulnerable workers in the country.

On 24 March 2026, RNZ reported:

 

ACT Party deputy and minister Brooke van Velden retires from politics

On the decisions she's made in government, van Velden said she's proud of all of them, including the highly controversial changes to the pay equity regime.

"I hand on heart believe that the decisions I made and the actions I took were in the best interests of the country, and ultimately I saved the Budget."

This is where the gaslighting becomes particularly galling. ACT has always presented itself as a party of individual freedom and fairness, the great liberators of the citizen from state interference. Yet when working women sought to use a legal framework to secure fair pay, the party moved with extraordinary speed to shut that framework down. The freedom ACT champions is, in practice, the freedom of employers to continue paying women less. Everything else is rhetoric.

That hypocrisy runs deeper still when one examines ACT's own internal culture. In June 2024, reporting by Stuff journalist Tova O'Brien revealed a picture of the ACT Party campaign operation that bore little resemblance to the party's libertarian self-image. At least six staff members and volunteers had quit following the 2023 general election, citing allegations of intimidation and unfair treatment of women. 

Sources described a culture of fear, comparing the campaign environment to the Hunger Games. The party's own board faced a vote of no confidence. Candidates and volunteers were left in tears. This is the organisation whose deputy leader was entrusted with protecting New Zealand's workers from exploitation and harm in the workplace. The irony here is profound.

On 7 June 2024, RNZ reported:

Tears and resignations after ‘train wreck’ ACT Party election campaign, sources claim

Allegations of a culture of fear

Several people close to the party spoke to Stuff on the condition of anonymity.

The divisions between "Mission Control" and "HQ" were at the heart of the ructions, they said.

"HQ became a bit like a military hospital," one source said. "Mission control, were shooting their kneecaps out faster than HQ could patch everybody up.

"It wasn't unusual to be at HQ and see people in tears, be it candidates or supporters, just sitting down saying I can't do this anymore."

Things got worse when problems started arising with candidates - one compared vaccine mandates to concentration camps, another compared the vaccine to drownings and another referred to Covid as "mass hysteria".

"There was a culture of fear in the party when the wheels started coming off around candidates, anyone that stuck their head up above the parapet was seen as dispensable."

Then there is the minimum wage manipulations. For nearly three consecutive years under this coalition, minimum wage increases have failed to keep pace with inflation. In real terms, New Zealand's most vulnerable workers have gone backwards every single year. This isn't economic bad luck. It is the predictable consequence of a government that regards minimum wage increases as an inconvenience. 

Van Velden happily presided over each of those inflation-adjusted wage cuts, invoking, as ACT ministers often do, the spectre of small business hardship.

On 26 October 2025, the NZ Herald (pay-walled) reported:

Meet Brooke van Velden – the minister loathed by unions and loved by business

Van Velden has been the most polarising minister of labour or workplace in the past 50 years for unions and workers.

Brooke van Velden's philosophical indifference to the welfare of ordinary people was perhaps most vividly exposed in her now-infamous comments about the value of human life. Appearing on Q&A with Jack Tame, she appeared to reconfirm that New Zealand had placed too high a value on human life during the COVID pandemic, stating that the country completely blew out what the value of a life was and that she had never seen such a high value on life.

The comment was not a gaffe. It was a window into the worldview that animated her entire tenure as the minister responsible for worker safety. That attitude to life ultimately followed her into the significant portfolios her mentor David Seymour attained for her in the right-wing coalition government.

Just like the covid response saving lives was not a bad thing for the economy, the evidence shows that higher minimum wages do not destroy jobs in the way Brooke van Velden and the ACT Party's ideological tradition has always insisted they will.

The rewriting of contractor law sits alongside these failures as a reform that will outlast the headlines. The changes narrowed the tests by which workers could establish that they were employees rather than contractors. In practice, this shifts power decisively toward the multinational platform companies, logistics operators, and labour hire firms that have always preferred contractor arrangements precisely because they eliminate sick leave, holiday pay, and the protections of the Employment Relations Act. 

Uber drivers, transport workers, construction workers, cleaners, security staff, and labour hire workers all had protections removed, stripping their rights to minimum wage protection, extended leave entitlements, unfair dismissal protections, and their employer's superannuation obligations. The language of worker choice and flexibility was deployed to obscure what was, in substance, a gift to corporate interests.

On 24 March 2026, Emily Writes reported:

So, Brooke Van Velden, this is your life...

Van Velden removed protections for all of these workers by allowing them to be classed as contractors despite their actual work situation. This removed their rights to minimum wage protection, extended leave entitlements, unfair dismissal protections and their employer's superannuation obligations. Her Employment Relations Amendment Bill essentially rewrote employer-employee relationship obligations into a form never before seen in the modern working world.

All of this has occurred against a backdrop of accelerating economic destruction that the coalition has done nothing to address. Heinz Wattie's announced the closure of three factories in Auckland, Christchurch, and Dunedin, affecting around 350 jobs. The McCain processing plant also shut its doors, leaving Buy NZ Made to warn that these closures reflected broader structural challenges facing New Zealand manufacturing, with almost half of surveyed producers citing slow demand. 

In Nelson alone, the closures of Kitchen Things, the Eves Valley sawmill, Proper Crisps, and Sealord's coated fish factory saw over 500 jobs vanish in the space of three months. In the first half of 2025, 1,270 businesses shut down, a 12 percent increase on the same period the year prior.

 

On 31 August 2025, E tū reported:

Manufacturing in crisis: Closures hit hard in 2025

It's been a devastating year for manufacturing workers around the motu, with major closures gutting local economies and leaving thousands of skilled workers out of a job.

...

These aren’t isolated incidents, but symptoms of a deeper failure. The Government has no clear plan to protect the country’s manufacturing base. While other countries invest in green tech, domestic supply chains, and set proper industrial strategies, Aotearoa is letting decades of expertise and infrastructure slip away. 

This is the economic environment in which van Velden was weakening worker protections, cutting real wages, attempting to gut health and safety regulations that were passed in the wake of the Pike River disaster, and handing legal advantages to employers. Families and survivors of the Pike River tragedy described their meeting with van Velden as a waste of time: She seemed to be focusing all the time on the employers, said Sonya Rockhouse. 

One might have expected a Minister for Workplace Relations to ask what impact her policy agenda was having on workers already confronting redundancy, casualisation, and economic insecurity. There is no evidence she did.

Then came the parliamentary theatre. In May 2025, in response to a Labour question referencing a Sunday Star-Times column by journalist Andrea Vance that had used the C word against the female ministers who dismantled pay equity, van Velden became the first MP to use that word in the debating chamber, framing her outburst as a defence of women against misogynistic language. 

The performance was characteristic: theatrical indignation deployed to reframe a debate about the stripping of women's rights into one about parliamentary decorum. It succeeded, briefly, in changing the subject, but the 300,000 women who lost their pay equity claims remained without recourse.

On 14 May 2025, RNZ reported:

Brooke van Velden drops C-word in Parliament

I do not agree with the clearly gendered and patronising language that [national affairs editor for the Sunday Star-Times] Andrea Vance used to reduce senior Cabinet ministers to girlbosses, hype squads, references to girl math and c****," van Velden said.

What we are witnessing, and have been witnessing since 2023, is the consequence of allowing ACT's neoliberalism to function as the ideological operating system of a government nominally led by the National Party. National, once a broad church capable of restraint and pragmatism, has been progressively colonised by ACT's worldview, an economic doctrine with a long and distinguished record of failure that stretches from the 1980s reforms Roger Douglas inflicted on New Zealand to its various iterations elsewhere. It treats labour as a cost to be minimised, regulation as an imposition to be dismantled, and workers as mere market actors who need only be freed from protection to flourish.

Van Velden leaves office with a record that should not be quietly filed away. It should be studied, in detail, as a case study in what happens when personally held beliefs outrank evidence, and when the interests of multinational corporations are accorded a higher priority than the dignity and security of working people.

New Zealand's Very Expensive Military Gamble

There is a particular kind of recklessness that masquerades as strategic vision. It does not announce itself as folly. It arrives dressed in the language of security partnerships, capability upgrades, and alliance obligations, and it is precisely this brand of recklessness that now defines the Luxon government's approach to New Zealand's military procurement.

The National-led coalition has committed approximately NZ$2.7 billion to the purchase of five Sikorsky Seahawk helicopters and associated military assets from the United States.

In August 2025, RNZ reported:

Watch: Judith Collins and Winston Peters reveal new $2.7b planes and helicopters

The purchases are the first that were forecast in the Defence Capability Plan unveiled in April, setting out an expected $12b in spending on defence assets over four years, $9b of that being new money.

The plan overall lifts New Zealand's defence spending to more than 2 percent of GDP over the next eight years.

There is a fundamental and largely unexamined question concerning these significant military acquisitions: what precisely does New Zealand receive in return for spending billions of dollars on American hardware, from an administration that has demonstrably withheld already-purchased, already-paid-for weapons from other allied nations the moment it suited Washington's political interests?

The answer, on current evidence, is very little. When the Trump administration ordered a freeze on military transfers, the consequences were not merely theoretical. Weapons already loaded onto trucks in Poland for onward delivery to Ukraine were stood down. Ammunition purchased using funds specifically appropriated by Congress for the purpose was simply not delivered.

Countries that had paid in good faith were left without the equipment they had contracted for and were offered no refund. These were not adversaries. They were partners, customers, and in several cases treaty allies who had done everything Washington asked of them.

New Zealand confirmed through MFAT that it had zero input into the Trump administration's Foreign Arms Sales Task Force priority partner list and did not even know whether it appeared on it. That the directive came with not only incentives but obligations: priority partners were expected to share production costs more substantially. New Zealand was apparently expected to pay more, without being consulted about whether it was considered a priority partner at all.

In April 2025, RNZ reported:

Officials don't know if NZ is on US priority weapons trading partners list

The NZ Defence Force is competing to get arms under its new $12 billion Defence Capability Plan in a world market where military spending is surging.

The NZDF talked with US lawmakers in April about potential opportunities to buy from the US, Official Information Act papers showed.

A foreign arms sales taskforce newly set up by Trump said it sought international input before launching its first six initiatives last month, including new legislation aimed to help lower the barriers that limit the proliferation of high-tech arms.

MFAT said: "New Zealand has not had any input into the taskforce."

 

That situation has since worsened. In February 2026, Trump signed a new executive order formally establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy, directing the Secretaries of Defense and State to develop clear priority partner criteria within 90 days and produce a prioritised sales catalogue within 120 days.

The order makes explicit that countries investing more heavily in their own defence and occupying a critical geographic role in US strategic plans will receive preferential treatment.

Despite increasing the military budget to 2% of GDP by 2032/33, as requested by the Trump administration, New Zealand has still received no public confirmation that it appears on that list. 

Official papers meanwhile show that 60 percent of the NZ Defence Force's $6 billion in arms currently on order is sourced from the United States. New Zealand has committed billions to a supplier whose formal priority framework it had no input into, whose criteria it may not meet, and whose list it may not even appear on.

This is the arrangement the Luxon government has chosen to deepen, at a cost of billions of dollars, during a period in which the geopolitical reliability of the United States as a supplier has been placed in serious and documented doubt. The pattern is not obscure. It is structural. American arms transfers have been converted from security commitments into instruments of political leverage, withheld when recipients pursue independent foreign policies, dangled when compliance is required, and apparently non-refundable in either case.

Meanwhile, the broader context in which New Zealand is making these procurement decisions has shifted considerably. The United States and Israel have conducted military operations across at least six countries in the past year, including strikes inside Qatar, a US Major Non-NATO Ally hosting the largest American air base in the region, without Doha's consent and with Qatar notified so late that it had no practical opportunity to prevent the attack.

The lesson for smaller allied nations is stark: allied status under the current Washington-Tel Aviv axis confers no guaranteed protection, and may offer no recourse whatsoever if the political winds change.

Against this backdrop, Winston Peters signed New Zealand's name to a joint statement expressing readiness to contribute to military efforts in the Strait of Hormuz, a strait closed in direct response to an American-led war launched without UN authorisation, and then spent the following week insisting the commitment meant nothing of the sort.

A functioning foreign minister cannot sign a document on a Friday and disclaim its meaning on a Tuesday. The commitment was made when New Zealand's name appeared on the paper.

What the Luxon government has managed, with impressive efficiency, is to spend billions locking New Zealand into military dependency on a supplier that does not consider us a priority, to sign documents attaching us to a war we had no hand in starting, and to do all of this without extracting a single meaningful concession in return. Not a tariff exemption. Not any guarantee of equipment delivery. Not a formal security guarantee. Not even confirmation that our name appears on the correct list.

Deference to Washington, as former Prime Minister Helen Clark and others have noted plainly, is not only distasteful. It is not working. And two and a half billion dollars' worth of helicopters, purchased from a government that views arms transfers as political bargaining chips, does not constitute a defence policy. It constitutes a very expensive gamble on the continued goodwill of an administration that has shown, repeatedly and in writing, that it does not feel especially obligated to honour its side of the arrangement.

New Zealand deserves better than that. It is not clear that this government has even noticed.